As of July 2024, it has become increasingly evident that Russia is losing the war against Ukraine. One doesn’t need to be a professional military analyst to understand this—it’s enough to follow the sentiments of ordinary Russians, who are increasingly feeling the impact of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in their daily lives. Even the vast distances from the border do not shield them from this reality.
Let’s take a closer look at what the Kremlin expected from this war and whether these plans have been realized nearly 30 months since the invasion began. The start of the full-scale invasion: They were waiting for us! The Russian army, which invaded Ukraine in February 2022, was confident that it would be welcomed there. With flowers. And the Russian army was indeed expected. However, the anticipation of flowers was a miscalculation.
On the eve of the invasion, the Ukrainian information space was overflowing with rumors and warnings that Putin was about to order his troops, concentrated at the Ukrainian borders, to begin full-scale hostilities. The country’s political leadership repeatedly dismissed the warnings from allies. Zelensky continued to play his usual role, assuring that there would be no invasion and there was no need to worry about a phantom danger, but instead, prepare for May barbecues.
It seemed that the ruling elite lived in their own illusory world, ignoring real threats. However, once the cameras were off, the President of Ukraine had to listen to very different words from the top leadership of the Armed Forces, the Chiefs of the General Staff, Security Service, and Intelligence. What was discussed behind closed doors, we can only guess. But the fact that the morning of February 24, 2022, was not a surprise for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) is indisputable.
From the way subsequent events unfolded, it is clear that the Ukrainian side was meticulously preparing for the Russian invasion, even if it did not show this publicly. Analyzing the start of the Russian Armed Forces invasion, it becomes evident that the enemy was deliberately allowed deep into the country to destroy as many personnel and military equipment as possible at the very outset.
Let’s indulge in a bit of speculation and consider what the situation would have been like if the Russian army had met stiff resistance right at the first kilometers of Ukrainian territory.
As already known from the speeches of official Russian representatives and state propagandists, the plan was to capture Kyiv within a week at most. Then, the Russian army, in parade uniform, which they brought with them, would march through Khreshchatyk. These wet dreams of the invaders did not come true, not least because Ukraine displayed a facade of calmness to the world on the eve of the invasion.
If the Ukrainian authorities and the army had loudly declared the redeployment of military units and equipment or preparations for the evacuation of the civilian population, the aggressor would likely have prepared for a prolonged war and approached logistics more thoughtfully. Russia would have prepared for long-term battles and built its strategy accordingly. But thanks to Ukraine’s well-thought-out information campaign, the Russian army crossed the border without a real understanding of what this step would lead to.
Regardless of the heavy losses incurred from the very first hours of the invasion, the Russian Armed Forces managed to occupy a significant portion of northern Ukraine (some areas of Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, and Kharkiv regions). However, they did not stay there long—by early April, most of the captured settlements were back under Ukrainian control. So, what happened? As propagandists later explained, it was a “gesture of goodwill.”
Let’s reconstruct the events from two years ago.
Russian generals, as always, planned to rely on their audacity and the element of surprise. On February 24, 2022, when the Ukrainian night was shattered by the roar of Russian missiles, planes, and helicopters, and when tank columns crossed the border from Belarus and Russia, they believed that achieving their objectives was a matter of hours: after all, who could resist the “second army of the world”? Imagine the surprise and then fear of Russian soldiers when they encountered fierce resistance.
According to BBC News Ukraine, citing General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) analytics, Russian troops, expecting swift advancement without resistance from the AFU, moved in marching columns without combat deployment. However, the Russian paratroopers and Rosgvardia units failed to follow their planned route in half a day.
In just the first few days of the invasion, brutal battles for the capital saw the 72nd Mechanized Brigade and the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade of the National Guard decimate battalion and company tactical groups from at least three elite Russian Airborne Forces divisions—the “Pskov”, “Ivanovo-Kostroma”, “Tula” divisions—and two marine brigades—the 155th from Vladivostok and the 40th from Kamchatka. Additionally, on March 9, separate units of the “Azov” regiment, together with the 72nd Brigade of the AFU, ambushed and destroyed a column of battalion tactical groups of the 6th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division near Skibin village, in the vicinity of Brovary. Nearly an entire regiment was lost, including its commander, Colonel Andrey Zakharov, halting the advance on Kyiv.
By late March 2022, the advantage began to shift in favor of Kyiv. The remnants of Russian forces in the Irpin area found themselves in operational encirclement. On March 28, Irpin was completely liberated.
On March 30, one of the last major battles in the Kyiv region occurred in Dmitrivka, a village north of the Zhytomyr highway. During the tank battle there, over 15 units of Russian military equipment were destroyed.
On March 31, the AFU cleared Bucha and Brovary, and on April 1, the last Russian units left Hostomel. By April 2, the entire Kyiv region was de-occupied. The territories of Chernihiv and Sumy regions were liberated around the same time.
As we can see, the secret preparations by the AFU bore fruit in the early months of the invasion, preventing the capture of the capital. Moreover, due to the coordinated actions of Ukrainian military and volunteers, nearly all previously occupied territories near the northern borders were liberated.
It is worth noting another small nuance: Ukrainians greeted their defenders with tears of joy, trying to hug each one and express gratitude for the liberation. People brought hot tea and freshly prepared food to the soldiers of the AFU. This scene is precisely what the Russian troops had expected for themselves at the time of the invasion, rather than the resistance and outrage they encountered from civilians.
Following the rapid liberation of the Kyiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv regions, Ukrainian forces continued to contain the Russian Armed Forces on a front reduced in size compared to the initial phase of the invasion. Ukraine mobilized, received counter-battery weaponry from allies, and began to decimate Russian units without slowing down.
This tempo—a strategic maneuver—was so effective that Russia had to implement partial mobilization. However, this decision came significantly late, as it was a response to failed plans and colossal losses in both personnel and equipment.
The Kharkiv offensive operation began on September 6, and within days, hundreds of square kilometers of Kharkiv region were liberated. The AFU shattered the Russian front. The Russian army hurriedly retreated, abandoning weapons and dozens of pieces of military equipment.
How did the Ukrainian Defense Forces achieve this? They effectively utilized the informational openness of modern society, where almost every word or action is instantly covered on the internet. Agree, it’s challenging to maintain secrecy and conceal intentions under such conditions. But Ukraine managed it once again.
During the preparation for the Kharkiv offensive, the enemy was misled, shifting focus to battles on the southern front. The information space was filled with reports of combat in the Kherson region, giving the Russian command the impression that the AFU was preparing to liberate Kherson.
This tactic helped achieve surprise: when the occupiers moved additional reserves south, the Ukrainian Defense Forces struck the Kharkiv region. This was the key aspect of achieving success in that direction. Details of the operation’s planning were covered by the American publication The Washington Post, whose journalists spoke with Ukrainian commanders and officials, as well as American and European officials involved in the preparation.
According to the American publication, the AFU Ground Forces Command had considered Kharkiv region and the strategic cities of Balakliya and Izyum, captured by Russians early in the invasion, as vulnerable points for the Russians since spring. During a meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff, when planning the southern operation and setting the AFU the task of planning some distraction actions at their discretion, it turned out that the enemy had moved part of its forces and resources from the Kharkiv region to the Kherson direction. Therefore, it was decided to focus on de-occupying the Kharkiv region.
To avoid massive losses in frontal assaults on cities, a plan was developed for Ukrainian forces to break deep into enemy positions, encircle settlements, and force the occupiers to retreat. Speed was crucial in this plan to prevent Russia from sending reserves across the border—from the Belgorod region.
The information campaign launched by Ukraine to distract Russia from preparing for the AFU’s offensive in the Kharkiv region was successful.
The counteroffensive operation in Kharkiv region began on September 6, 2022. According to the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW), from September 6 to 10, Ukrainian forces broke through Russian positions to depths of up to 70 km in places and recaptured 3,000 square kilometers of territory. The liberation of Izyum was considered by analysts as Ukraine’s most significant military success after the victory in the Battle of Kyiv. This was another important step towards Russia’s defeat in this war.
Without slowing down after the success in the Kharkiv direction, Ukrainian forces continued their offensive actions in the south, which began on August 29, 2022.
Before the start of the southern operation, the information space was flooded with numerous media reports that Ukraine was planning a large-scale offensive specifically in the Kherson region. First mentioned in mid-June 2022 and repeatedly reiterated, these messages aimed to mislead the enemy and force them to move reserves to the Kherson direction, drawing them away from other areas, primarily the Kharkiv region. Ultimately, hints that soon Ukrainian soldiers would be eating Kherson watermelons achieved their goal – Russian forces were indeed expecting the main strike to be in the south.
The offensive in the Kherson region occurred in three stages, during which Ukrainian troops steadily increased pressure on enemy positions while simultaneously disrupting the logistical support of the Russian forces’ grouping on the right bank of the Dnipro. Significant successes during the first days of the offensive finally convinced the enemy that the main Ukrainian strike was happening in the south.
The Ukrainian offensive in the south was accompanied by intense artillery strikes on positions, ammunition depots, and command posts of Russian forces, as well as bases, bridges, and crossings in the enemy’s rear. The powerful fire advantage of the Ukrainians, who used Western-supplied weapons, particularly HIMARS MLRS, prevented Russia from counterattacking.
By the end of September, Ukrainian forces in the south managed to advance approximately 15 km, reaching the administrative border of the Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk regions and securing a bridgehead beyond the Inhulets River. The number of liberated settlements reached 13, and the area of deoccupied territory was about 1000 square kilometers.
The second phase of the Kherson offensive operation took place in the first half of October 2022. The main offensive actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces occurred in the Beryslav direction on the eastern bank of the Inhulets, where they managed to advance up to 40 km deep, deoccupying an area of about 1200 square kilometers and liberating 29 settlements.
The success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces led to an order from the Russian command to retreat to the left bank. The approximately 40,000-strong Russian group located on the right bank of the Dnipro had already been cut off from supplies and risked being encircled. The concentration of Russian troops retreating in the areas of crossings allowed Ukrainian military aviation and artillery to inflict numerous strikes on them, destroying soldiers and equipment.
Another “gesture of goodwill” allowed the Armed Forces of Ukraine to begin the final phase of the Kherson offensive operation, which lasted from November 8 to 12, 2022. The Ukrainians advanced up to 40 km, liberating about 3500 square kilometers and 169 settlements. On November 11, 2022, the Ukrainian offensive culminated in the liberation of Kherson.
The first mention of the Ukrainian Armed Forces employing the “thousand cuts” tactic emerged in the summer of 2022 when the Defense Forces began to wear down the Russian army with targeted strikes, forcing them to relocate combat units from one direction to another to respond to Ukrainian army actions. This tactic was clearly visible during the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives. At that time, Ukraine successfully confused the Russian army command and forced it to act in the desired direction through a well-executed information campaign.
After defeats in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, Russian forces focused on building defensive fortifications in the remaining areas where they still held the line. Clearly, offensive actions were no longer an option. But did this help?
In 2023, the Ukrainian Armed Forces liberated several settlements in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions. This year, the main events also unfolded in the east. The fighting in Donbas continues, where Russia persistently tries to capture Chasiv Yar, losing equipment and soldiers daily. Since the beginning of the campaign near this small industrial town, once home to 12,000 people, the Russian army has already lost at least 99,000 soldiers.
The situation is also tense in the rear, where almost daily missiles or unknown (read – Ukrainian) UAVs strike. These strikes ignite oil depots and refineries, military-industrial facilities, and airfields; ammunition intended for the war against Ukraine detonates; planes, helicopters, and ships are put out of action.
These targeted strikes, carried out with Ukrainian and Western weapons (permission for their use in Russian border regions was obtained after Russia’s failed attempt to capture Kharkiv in the summer of 2024), are also elements of the “thousand cuts” tactic. They are primarily aimed at disrupting logistics.
Another Ukrainian Armed Forces innovation is the use of various types of drones for combat tasks. Recently, Israeli military expert Yigal Levin, referring to statements by propagandist Alexander Kharchenko, wrote that logistics problems for Russian forces have significantly worsened over the past year: whereas previously, armored vehicles with supplies were unloaded one kilometer from the front line, now, due to the increased number of UAV strikes, unloading must occur 8-10 kilometers away. Supplies are then delivered to the front either on motorcycles and ATVs or even manually.
Since receiving the first HIMARS MLRS on June 23, 2022, the rear areas of Russian troops have become more accessible to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. One of the first strikes with this system targeted the command post of the 20th Army of the Western Military District of the Russian Armed Forces (military unit 89425, Voronezh), located in a school building in Izyum. This strike killed 17 Russian military personnel, including a colonel and two majors, and wounded about 20 others. Since then, strikes on Russian rear areas and ammunition and military equipment depots on occupied territories have only increased.
With precise strikes, the Ukrainian Armed Forces destroyed Russian army bases and locations in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where they had been established since 2014. The military infrastructure and positions of the Russian Federation in the occupied parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions were also not overlooked. This helped disrupt supply routes.
In the summer of 2022, Ukraine’s Defense Forces targeted bridges over the Dnipro River to destroy Russian logistics on the right bank of the Kherson region and the occupied areas of the Mykolaiv region. The largest of these was the Antonivsky Road Bridge in Kherson.
High-precision strikes on this transportation structure, which Russian forces used to transport personnel and ammunition, were carried out using GMLRS family guided missiles with a caliber of 227 mm, which can be used with the M142 HIMARS and M270 systems. During the Ukrainian offensive in the Kherson region at the end of August, HIMARS crews operated continuously for 37 hours, hitting 120 targets.
On October 8, 2022, Ukraine struck the Crimean Bridge for the first time. As stated by SBU head Vasyl Malyuk in the documentary “Crimean Bridge Again,” the first attack on the bridge used homemade explosive devices and 15 tons of hexogen mixture, equivalent to 21 tons of TNT. It took over eight months to restore traffic on the bridge.
The SBU struck the bridge a second time on July 17, 2023, using specially developed See Baby sea drones. This joint operation by the SBU and the Ukrainian Navy seriously disrupted the 19-kilometer bridge’s function and changed perceptions of Russia’s invincibility.
Overall, the first attacks on Russian forces in occupied Crimea, which had been turned into a fortified military base, date back to late July 2022. Since then, training grounds, airfields, missile installations, air defense systems, and other facilities have been targeted. The Russian Black Sea Fleet has also suffered significantly from Ukrainian attacks.
For instance, on September 13, 2023, seven missiles struck the Sevastopol Marine Plant named after Ordzhonikidze, where at least two ships were being repaired: the submarine “Rostov-on-Don” and the large landing ship “Minsk.” Several more missiles hit the Southern and Naval Bays, targeting infrastructure facilities. On November 5, several missiles bombed the marine and port infrastructure of the Zaliv shipbuilding plant, hitting one of Russia’s most modern ships, the “Askold,” a carrier of Kalibr missiles.
During the “Crab Trap” operation in September 2023, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a series of strikes on Sevastopol with Storm Shadow missiles, one of which flew into the Black Sea Fleet headquarters during a meeting. Another strike on the Black Sea Fleet’s command center was carried out in the early days of this year.
Additionally, they managed to hit a secret GRU base near Sevastopol and an FSB base in Solnechnogorsk, as well as the Center for Long-Distance Space Communications in the village of Vitino.
These Ukrainian strikes on Crimea have had immediate consequences for Ukraine. First, Russia was forced to withdraw the remnants of its fleet from the Black Sea near the peninsula, significantly reducing missile attacks on Ukrainian cities.
Second, the destruction of air defense and electronic warfare systems opened new opportunities for regular strikes on Russian military equipment and positions. On August 2, 2024, units of the missile forces, in cooperation with units of the Ukrainian Navy, significantly damaged four S-400 Triumph air defense launchers. Also, in the port of Sevastopol, the Ukrainian military successfully hit the Russian Black Sea Fleet submarine “Rostov-on-Don,” which sank on the spot due to the hit. As hinted at by the Ukrainian General Staff: to be continued…
The collapse of Russia is rapidly approaching. This is confirmed daily by events both on the battlefield and in politics. Just consider everything that has happened in the last few months. Failure after failure, defeat after defeat – this is the karma of an aggressor invading a sovereign state, as Russia is seen in the eyes of the entire civilized world.
Ukrainian strikes on the locations of the Russian army in the border Belgorod region prompted local authorities to consider creating a “sanitary zone.” It was with this aim that an attempted breakthrough in the Kharkiv direction was made, which again ended in failure. Do you really believe that Ukraine forgot to mine territories in that direction? No, it was another mousetrap. The Ukrainian Armed Forces repeated their favorite trick – lure the enemy as far away from the main forces and supplies as possible and then crush them. This was something everyone could observe virtually live.
It is worth noting that Ukrainians not only incurred fewer losses than Russia, but they also received permission from almost all allies to use Western weapons against military targets in the Russian border areas. This means that Ukraine no longer has to worry about any European or American politician causing a scandal over this. However, Russia has much to worry about, but it won’t save them anymore.
Targeted strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Russian territory are destroying the military capabilities of the Russian army: fewer planes, fewer shells, less fuel. The ability to continue the war is rapidly decreasing.
Do not forget that by early February 2024, Ukrainian strikes had put approximately 33% of the combat ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of action. Specifically, 24 ships and one submarine. By the end of summer, this number had increased.
Every morning brings news to Ukrainians of another military or military-industrial target being hit on Russian territory. Every night for a Russian citizen is gradually turning into an anticipation of horrors because none of them know where Ukrainian drones and missiles will strike next. It seems that for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there are no borders – their UAVs reach as far as a thousand kilometers, as has happened more than once.
Just recall the oil refinery in Bashkortostan, where a Ukrainian drone struck the oil catalytic cracking unit on May 9, covering 1500 km from the Ukrainian border. Or the night of July 27, 2024, when kamikaze drones hit the oil refinery in Ryazan and the strategic aviation airfields “Engels,” “Dyagilevo,” and “Olenya.” Note that the UAVs covered a distance of 1800 km from the Ukrainian state border to the last airfield.
And let us not forget the sanctions imposed against Russia by the United States, the European Union, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Although propagandists shout after each new package that sanctions do not work, their consequences are becoming more visible every day. It should also be noted that sanctions are imposed not only against Russia and foreign companies cooperating with it. Intermediary firms helping Russia circumvent bans on the supply of military and dual-purpose goods are also being sanctioned.
Remember that on July 26, the European Union announced the first payment of 1.5 billion euros for military support to Ukraine from extraordinary receipts from frozen Russian assets in the EU. This concerns the assets of the Russian Central Bank, which were frozen as a result of the EU sanctions against Russia after the start of the war in Ukraine.
Another signal of Russia’s impending defeat was the transfer of Western F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine, officially confirmed by Zelensky on August 4, on the Ukrainian Air Force Day. How this will change the situation at the front – we will see in the near future.